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UNITED STATES v. ARMSTRONG
116 S. Ct. 1480 (1996)
United States Supreme Court
I. FACTS
In April 1992, Christopher Armstrong, Aaron
Hampton, Freddie Mack, and Robert Rozelle ,re-
spondents, were indicted in the Federal District
Court for the Central District of California for con-
spiring to possess with intent to distribute and con-
spiring to distribute over fifty grams of cocaine base
(commonly known as "crack) in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§841 and 846. ' The charges against respon-
dents resulted from the infiltration of a suspected
crack ring by members of the Federal Bureau of Al-
cohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) and California
Police Department, Narcotics Division.2
In response to the indictment, respondents filed
a motion for discovery or, in the alternative, for dis-
missal of the indictment on the ground that they
were selected for federal prosecution because they
were black.3 Respondents supported the motion
with an affidavit from a paralegal specialist employed
with the Office of the Federal Public Defender.4 The
affidavit alleged that in every 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and
846 case dosed by that office in 1991, the defen-
dant had been black. The government opposed the
motion, claiming that no evidence or allegation ex-
isted of the government's acting unfairly or failing
to prosecute similarly situated non-black defen-
dants. 6 The district court rejected the government's
argument and granted respondents' motion. It or-
dered the government to
(1) provide a list of all cases from the last three
years in which the Government charged both
cocaine and firearms offenses; (2) identify the
race of the defendants in those cases; (3) iden-
tify what levels of law enforcement were in-
volved in the investigation of those cases; (4)
explain its criteria for deciding to prosecute
those defendants.7
I United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480, 1483
(1996).
2Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1483.




The government moved for reconsideration of
the discovery order.8Accompanying the motion were
affidavits and other evidence explaining why the
gonvernment had chosen to prosecute respondents.9
In the affidavits, federal and local agents participat-
ing in the case stated in affidavits that race had played
no role in their investigation.' 0 In addition, an assis-
tant United States attorney affirmed that the deci-
sion to prosecute respondents met the general cri-
teria for prosecution:
[Tihere was over 100 grams of cocaine base in-
volved, over twice the threshold necessary for
a ten year mandatory minimum sentence; there
were multiple sales involving multiple defen-
dants, thereby indicating a fairly substantial
crack cocaine ring... the overall evidence in
the case was extremely strong including several
audio and video tapes of defendants.., and
several of the defendants had criminal histories
including narcotics and firearms violations."
The government also submitted sections of a pub-
lished 1989 Drug Enforcement Administration re-
port which stated that the manufacture and distri-
bution of cocaine base (crack) is controlled by Ja-
maican, Haitian, and Black Street gangs.'
2
In response to the government's motion for re-
consideration, respondents' attorney, acting as a wit-
ness, submitted an affidavit alleging that an intake
coordinator at a drug treatment center reported an
equal number of caucasians and minorities using and
dealing crack.'3 The respondents also submitted an
affidavit from a criminal defense attorney who stated
that in his experience, many non-black defendants
charged with possession of crack were prosecuted
in state court, while black crack defendants were
prosecuted in federal court.14 Sentencing in the fed-






12J. Featherly & Hill, Crack Cocaine Overview 1989.
13Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1484.
14116 S. Ct. at 1484.
cause of sentencing guidelines, inandatory minimum
sentencing, and the absence of parole. The criminal
defense attorney further stated that federal crack
defendants, who were almost always black, were
punished far more severely than federal powder
cocaine defendants, who were-mostly non-black."
The district court denied the government's mo-
tion for reconsideration. 16 When the government
indicated it would not comply with the court's dis-
covery order, the court dismissed the case.' 7 On ap-
peal, a divided three-judge panel of the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court.s
The court of appeals held that the "defendants must
provide a colorable basis for believing that others
similarly situated have not been prosecuted" in or-
der to obtain discovery on a selective-prosecution
claim.' 9 The court relied on the reasoning in United
States v. Bourgeois.20 In Bourgeois, federal and local
law enforcement agents arrested more than 100 gang
members in South Central Los Angeles as a part of
operation "Streetsweep."2' The government pros-
ecuted ten arrestees, including defendant Bourgeois,
for federal firearm violations.22 All ten persons were
black men. Defendant Bourgeois claimed that the
decision to prosecute him was unconstitutionally
based on race and sought discovery of government
documents about operation "Streetsweep."23 The
United States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the threshold necessary to obtain discovery in
selective prosecution should not be so high as to
require establishing a prima facie case. 24 Instead, a
defendant had only to present specific facts which
established a colorable basis for the existence of dis-
criminatory effect.2s The Ninth Circuit denied Bour-
geois' discovery motion. It found that he failed to
establish a colorable basis of discriminatory effect
because he failed to show that similarly situated non-
blacks had not been prosecuted.
26
The Ninth Circuit voted to rehear the case en
banc 27 The en banc panel affirmed the district court,
'Id. (citing Newton, Harsher Crack Sentences Criti-




18 See United States v. Armstrong, 21 F.3d 1431, 1438
(1994) [hereinafter Armstrong I].
19ArmnstrongI, 21 F.3d at 1436 (citing United States v.
Wayte, 710 E2d 1385, 1387 (9th Cir. 1983)).
20 United States v. Bourgeois, 964 E2d 935 (9th Cir.
1992).
21964 F.2d at 936.
22Id.
holding that the defendant was not required to dem-
onstrate the government's failure to prosecute simi-
larly situated persons.2 The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari to determine the appropri-
ate standard for granting discovery in a selective-
prosecution claim.
II. HOLDING
The Court held that Federal Rule of Crimi-
nal Procedure 16(a)(1)(c) authorized defendants
to examine government documents material to
the preparation of their defense against the
government's case-in-chief 29 However, Rule 16
did not permit examination of government docu-
ments that were material to the preparation of
selective-prosecution claims. 30 To obtain discov-
ery in a selective-prosecution claim, respondents
must provide some evidence that tends to show
discriminatory effect and discriminatory intent.3'
In order to show discriminatory effect, respon-
dents had to prove that similarly situated defen-
dants of other races could have been prosecuted
but were not.32 Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer concurred with the majority opinion.
33
III. ANALYSIS/ APPLICATION
A. FEDERAL RULE OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 16
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 governs
discovery in criminal cases. In pertinent part, Fed-
eral Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1) (c) reads:
Upon request of the defendant the government
shall permit the defendant to inspect and copy
or photograph books, papers, documents, pho-
tographs, tangible objects, buildings or places,
or copies or portions thereof, which are within
3 Id. at 937.
24 Id. at 939.
2s Id. at 938 (citing United States v. Balk, 706 F.2d
1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 1983)).
26 Id. at 941.
27 United States v. Armstrong, 48 F.3d 1508 (1995)
{hereinafter Armstrong II].
28AmstrongII, 48 F.3d at 1516.
29Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1485.
30116 S. Ct. at 1485.
3"Id. at 1488.
32 Id.
33 This case comment does not discuss the opinions
of Justices Souter and Ginsburg. Justice Breyer concurred
the possession, custody or control of the gov-
emment, and which are material to the prepa-
ration of the defendant's defense or are intended
for use by the government as evidence in chief
at the trial, or were obtained from or belong to
the defendant.
Respondents contended that Rule 16(a)(1)(c)
granted them discovery of documents which dis-
cussed the government's prosecution strategy for
cocaine cases because these documents were ma-
terial to respondents' selective-prosecution
claims. 34 Rule 16 allows discovery of documents,
"material to the preparation of defendant's de-
fense," not to the preparation of related claims.
35
However, respondents offered their selective-
prosecution claim as a defense.36 The court re-
jected respondents' argument because the
"defendant's defense" language of Rule 16 refers
to a defendant's affirmative response to the
government's case-in-chief.37 The court stated:
While it might be argued that as a general mat-
ter, the concept of a "defense" includes any
claim that is a "sword", challenging the
prosecution's conduct of the case, the term may
encompass only the narrower class of "shield"
claims, which refute the government's argu-
in the majority opinion but wrote separately because
of his view that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16
does not limit a defendant's discovery rights to documents
related to the government's case-in-chief A-nstrong, 116
S. Ct. at 1489. He stated that a defendant's defense can
take many forms, only one of which is a response to the
case-in-chief 116 S. Ct. at 1490. Defendant's defense can
also include an affirmative defense, an unrelated claim of
constitutional right, or a rebuttal which anticipates a gov-
ernment rebuttal. Id. Justice Breyer also stated that the
discovery sought byArmstrong did not fall under the privi-
lege protecting work product. Id. at 1491. However, he
agreed with the denial of discovery because defendants
did not satisfy the materiality requirement of Rule 16. Id.
34Arnstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1485.







"1 See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985).
Petitioner in Wayte wrote several letters to government
officials stating that he had not registered with Selective
Service and did not intend to do so. Wayte, 470 U.S. at
601. His letter was added to a file of others who had in-
formed the government of their unwillingness to register
ments that the defendant committed the crime
charged. Rule 16(a)(1)(c) tends to support the
"shield- only" reading."
The court also relied on the language of Rule
16(a)(2) which exempts government work product
or documents made in connection with the investi-
gation of the case from inspection by the defense.
3 9
The court stated that respondents' construction of
"defense" would allow all defendants to examine
government work product. Such a construction, it
found, was implausible.
40
B. STANDARD FOR GRANTING
DISCOVERY IN A SELECTIVE-
PROSECUTION CLAIM
The Attorney General and United States attor-
neys have broad discretion to enforce the nation's
criminal laws.4' They are constitutionally and statu-
torily responsible for prosecuting all offenses against
the United States.42 So long as there is probable cause
to believe that an accused has committed an offense,
the decision whether or not to prosecute and what
charge to bring before a Grand Jury generally rests
with the prosecutor.43 However, a prosecutor's dis-
cretion is subject to the constitutional constraints
imposed by the equal protection component of the
with Selective Service. 470 U.S. at 601. The government
adopted a "passive enforcement" policy under which it
would prosecute only persons named in the file Id. After
several attempts to register these young men, the United
States attorneys began indicting them for failing to regis-
ter with Selective Service. Id. at 603. Petitioner moved
for dismissal of the indictment for selective prosecution.
Id. at 604. He claimed that he and others in the Selective
Service file were vocal opponents of Selective Service and
were being singled out for asserting their First Amend-
ment rights. Id. The Court upheld the court of appeals'
denial of the motion stating, "In our criminal justice sys-
tem, the government retains broad discretion as to whom
to prosecute." Id. at 607.
42 See U.S. Const. art. II, § 3 ([The President] shall
take care that the laws be faithfully executed). See also 28
U.S.C. §516 ("the conduct of litigation in which the United
States . . . is a party... is reserved to officers of the
Department of Justice under the direction of the Attor-
ney General; 28 U.S.C. §547(1) ("except as provided by
law, each United States Attorney within his district shall.
prosecute for all offenses against the United States').
43 See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
Respondent Hayes was indicted on charges of uttering a
forged instrument in amount of $88.30. Id. at 358. Pros-
ecutor offered to recommend sentence of five years if
Hayes would plead guilty. Id. If he pled not guilty, the
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.44 Thus, the
decision whether to prosecute may not be based on
an impermissible standard such as race, religion, or
other arbitrary classification. 45 In Yick Wo v.
Hopkins,46 the court stated," a defendant may dem-
onstrate that the administration of a criminal law is
directed so exclusively against a particular class of
persons ... with a mind so unequal and oppressive
that the system of prosecution amounts to a practi-
cal denial of equal protection of the law."47 In order
to dispel the presumption that a prosecutor has not
violated the equal protection clause, a criminal de-
fendant must present "clear evidence" to the con-
trary.
48
A selective prosecution claim asks a court to
exercise judicial power over the executive branch.
The United States Supreme Court expressed its hesi-
tancy to examine the decision whether to prosecute
in Wayte v. United States, noting that a prosecutor's
broad discretion makes it ill suited to judicial re-
view. 49 Examining questions about the prosecution's
general deterrence value, the government's enforce-
ment priorities, and a case's relationship to the
government's overall enforcement plan is not the
kind of inquiry that courts are competent to under-
take. 0 Furthermore, examining the basis of
prosecutorial delays in criminal proceedings, threat-
prosecutor would seek an indictment under the Habitual
Criminal Act. Id. Under the Act, Hayes would be subject
to a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. Id. at 359.
Hayes pled not guilty. Id. Hayes objected that his indict-
ment under the Act violated the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held that the
prosecutor's conduct was not unconstitutional. Id. at 365.
44See United States v. Batchelde, 442 U.S. 114, 125
(1979).4
1See Oylerv. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962). Petitioner
Oyler was convicted of second degree murder which car-
ried a penalty of five to eighteen years. Oyler, 368 U.S. at
449. The Court determined that he had thrice been con-
victed of crimes, and it sentenced him to life imprison-
ment under the West Virginia habitual criminal statute.
368 U.S. at 450. Oyler then filed petition for writ of ha-
beas corpus alleging that the statute had been applied only
to a minority of persons, in violation of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. The Court
found no constitutional violation because the petitioner
did not allege that the statute was deliberately applied
according to an unjustifiable standard such as race or reli-
gion. Id. at 455.
46 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
47YickWo, 118 U.S. at 373.
41 See United States v. Chemical Foundation, 272 U.S.
1, 14-15 (1926) (holding that the presumption of regu-
ens to chill law enforcement by subjecting the
prosecutor's motives and decision making to out-
side inquiry, and it may undermine prosecutorial
effectiveness by revealing the government's enforce-
mentpolicy.
51
Because the process of discovery diverts gov-
ernment resources from a case and could reveal the
prosecution's strategy, the showing necessary to ob-
tain discovery in a selective prosecution claim is a
demanding one. A claimant must put forth some
evidence that tends to show (1) that the
prosecutorial policy had a discriminatory effect and
(2) that it was motivated by a discriminatory pur-
pose."2 To establish racially discriminatory effect, the
claimant must show that similarly situated individu-
als of a different race were not prosecuted. 3 In
Armstrong II, 4 the Ninth Circuit erroneously held
that a defendant may establish discriminatory ef-
fect without evidence that the government failed to
prosecute similarly situated persons of other races.15
The court of appeals reached its conclusion based
on the presumption that people of all races commit
every type of crime and that one category of crime
is not exclusive to any particular racial group. 6 The
United States Supreme Court opposed this propo-
sition with recent statistics of the United States Sen-
tencing Commission. Those statistics showed that
larity supports official acts of public officers, and, in ab-
sence of clear evidence to contrary, a court will presume
that they have properly discharged their official duties).
49 Wayte, 470 U.S. at 598.
50470 U.S at 607.511d.
52 Oyler v. Boyles; 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962).
53 SeeAh Sin v. Wittman, 198 U.S. 500 (1905) (hold-
ing ordinance unconstitutional because the petitioner
failed to allege that the conditions and practices to which
ordinance was directed did not exist exclusively among
the Chinese and that the ordinance was not enforced
against some non-Chinese offenders). Petitioner in Ah Sin
sought a writ of habeas corpus seeking discharge from
imprisonment. Ah Sin. 198 U.S. at 503. He was impris-
oned under a San Francisco ordinance prohibiting per-
sons from setting up gambling tables in rooms barricaded
to stop police from entering. 198 U.S. at 505. The peti-
tion alleged that the ordinance violated the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution because it deprived plain-
tiff of equal protection. Id. at 506. Specifically, petitioner
alleged that the ordinance was enforced exclusively against
persons of Chinese heritage. Id.
S4Armstrong If, 48 F.3d 1508.
55Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1488.
1
6 116 S. Ct. at 1488.
90 percent of the persons sentenced in 1994 for crack
cocaine trafficking were black.57 The statistics also
showed that 93.4 percent of convicted LSD dealers
were white.5s The court of appeals also based its
conclusion on concerns about the evidentiary ob-
stacles defendants face in a selective prosecution
claim. 9 The court noted the notorious difficulty of
proving race discrimination,6' stating that
[t]he broad discretion that prosecutors possess
over charging decisions means that they alone
will often possess the only information that
would demonstrate such discrimination. As a
result, the data necessary to a showing of selec-
tive prosecution are far less accessible to the
defendants that to the government. 6'
The Court disagreed with this rationale. It explained
that if a selective prosecution claim were well
founded, a defendant should be able to prove, with-
out difficulty, that similarly situated non-black de-
fendants were treated differently.6 The Court con-
cluded that requiring a threshold showing of differ-
ent treatment of similarly situated persons ad-
equately balances the government's interest in vig-
orous prosecution and the defendant's interest in
avoiding selective prosecution.6
C. DISSENT
Justice Stevens dissented from the majority
opinion. He stated that the possibility of political or
racial animosity infecting a decision to institute
criminal proceedings cannot be ignored.6 For that
reason, the prosecutor's broad discretion should not
be completely unbridled.65 Even if respondents failed
to carry their burden of showing that similarly situ-
ated persons were not prosecuted, the district court
did not abuse its discretion in ordering discovery.66
The district court should have been able to take ju-
dicial notice of the government's acting unfairly and
-7United States Sentencing Commission 1994 An-
nual Report 107 (Table 45)
51Id. at41 (Table 13).
59Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1489.
6'ArmstrongII, 48 F.3d at 1514.
61 Id. (citing Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598
(1985)).
6Arnmtrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1489.





demand information from their files to support or
refute respondents' selective prosecution claim.
6'
The Anti Drug AbuseAct of 19 86 61 and subsequent
legislation established extremely high penalties for
the possession and distribution of crack cocaine.0
In addition, the state law criminal justice system
involved the absence of mandatory minimums, the
existence of parole, and lower baseline penalties.
Hence, punishment under federal law far more se-
vere then under state law.70 Although 65 percent of
crack users are white, they represent only 4 percent
of federal offenders.7 ' Black defendants comprised
88 percent of federal crack offenders.72 During the
first eighteen months that the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines were in force, blacks received sentences
40 percent longer than whites. 73 These figures
showed the heightened danger of arbitrary enforce-
ment and the need for careful scrutiny of any
colorable claim of discriminatory enforcement. 74
IV. CONCLUSION
The United StatesSupreme Court reversed the
judgment of the court of appeals on the ground that
respondents did not put forth some evidence tend-
ing to show the existence of the essential elements
of a selective prosecution claim. Specifically, they
failed to identify individuals who were not black,
could have been prosecuted for the offenses for
which respondents were charged, but were not so
prosecuted. This "similarly situated" requirement is
harsh. In Armstrongl,'7 the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals favored a more relaxed standard of grant-
ing discovery in selective prosecution claims. The
court focused on the evidentiary problems that de-
fendants face when trying to prove a colorable basis
for selective prosecution. 76 Recent United States
Supreme Court cases indicate a trend toward abol-
ishing programs specifically intended to benefit mi-
norities.77 This trend suggests that the mentality of
America is becoming increasingly unsympathetic to
621 U.S.C. § 841 (1994).
6Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1492.





75 ArmstrongII, 48 E3d 1508 (9th Cir. 1995).
7648 E3d at 1514.
77 See Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097
(1995); Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995); Mis-
souri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995).
minorities. The Court and the media reflect a gen-
eral belief that discrimination has been eradicated
and that persons who alleges that they have been
subjected to discriminatory treatment are paranoid.
The new"color blind" view of America will make it
more difficult to convince the courts that racial dis-
crimination is still present in the American criminal
justice system. Hence, requiring a defendant to show
that similarly situated defendants were not pros-
ecuted will prevent any defendant from bringing a
sucessful discrimination claim against the govern-
ment.
Summary and Analysis Prepared by:
James M. Williams
